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Reconciling Facts with Fiction, or:  
A Theoretical Speculation of  
why the Minimum Wage has  
no Discernible Effect  
on Employment 
 
Arne Heise 1 
 
 
Abstract  
Purpose – There has long been a discussion about the employment impact of 
minimum wages and this discussion has recently been renewed with the introduction 
of an economy-wide, binding minimum wage in Germany in 2015. In traditional 
reasoning, based on the allocation-based approach of modern labour market 
economics, it has been suggested that the impact is clearly negative on the assumption 
of a competitive labour market and clearly positive on the assumption of a 
monopsony-based labour market.  
Design/methodology/approach – A post-Keynesian employment market, based 
on a different pre-analytical vision of the economy than traditional mainstream 
economics, is presented here.  
Findings – The most likely prediction of the employment effect of minimum wages 
based on the alternative model presented here - a negligible impact on overall 
employment - is very much in line with the empirical evidence established by a bulk of 
literature.  
Research limitations/implications – The research proposes an analytical 
framework and invites future empirical investigation.  
Originality/value – The paper contends that existing literature affords too much 
attention to a (false) theoretical approach based on the pre-analytic vision of market 
exchange as basic constituent of capitalist economies.  
Paper type - Conceptual paper 
 
Keywords: Minimum Wage, post-Keynesianism, Labour Market Theory. 
 
                                                 
1 University of Hamburg, Dept. of Socio-economics. Email address: Arne.Heise@wiso.uni-
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1. Introduction 
 
The discussion about minimum wages is an old one2. The introduction of a 
minimum wage in Germany in 2015 added yet another chapter to that 
discussion3. While most mainstream economists – represented by the majority 
position within the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat) 
– claim that there is a negative employment effect, particularly for lower-skilled 
and young, inexperienced workers (see SVR 2013: 284ff.), progressive or 
dissenting economists – represented by the minority position within the 
German Council of Economic Experts – argue that a minimum wage will 
actually increase the quantity of employment (see SVR 2013: 289f., Bofinger 
2014: 164ff.). 
Both positions are based on a partial analysis of the labour market using 
allocational reasoning. Assuming the ordinary labour market to be 
characterized by perfect competition – as the mainstream position does – a 
minimum wage will undoubtedly have significantly negative employment 
effects once the minimum wage is higher than the market-clearing wage rate 
associated with the respective skill level4. This is so, because any job that does 
not earn its labour cost, i.e. where the (minimum) wage rate is higher than the 
marginal productivity of that job, will eventually be priced out of the market. 
And a minimum wage that is set below the market-clearing wage rate would 
clearly be useless. This straightforward result, based on the pre-analytical vision 
of the labour market being the operator of intertemporal exchange between 
(real) income, leisure time and postponed consumption, can only be altered 
without challenging that pre-analytical vision by refuting the assumption of 
perfect competition. Assuming a monopsonistic labour market, i.e. a labour 
market with one (dominant) employer, a minimum wage rate set between the 
profit-maximizing wage rate of the monopsonistic firm and the maximum 
wage rate associated with the productivity of the same quantity of employment 
will increase the level of employment and reduce the mark-down on wages 
(see, e.g., Manning 2003; Ashenfelter/Farber/Ransom 2010).  
Both models present clear cut and opposing predictions about the impact of 
minimum wage rates on employment and it should, therefore, be easy to 
evaluate these theories empirically: As there are many countries with long 
histories of minimum wage legislation (Neumark/Wascher 2008: 9ff., ILO 
                                                 
2 For an overview, see Neumark/Salas/Wascher (2014). 
3 See e.g. Heitger 2003, Franz 2007, Bauer/Kluve/Schaffner/Schmidt 2009, 
Paloyo/Schaffner/Schmidt 2013. 
4 Most simulation studies for Germany predicted a loss of more than one million jobs (i.e. 
about 3% of total employment!) if the current minimum wage of 8,50€ was introduced (see, 
e.g., Schuster 2013: 33). 
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2014), we should be in a position to falsify either of the two models or, rather, 
the assumptions on which they rest. Alas, meta-studies on the minimum wage 
(see, e.g., Doucouliagos/Stanley 2009; Wolfson/Belman 2014) paint a 
perplexing picture: “Economists have conducted hundreds of studies of the 
employment impact of the minimum wage. Summarizing those studies is a 
daunting task, but two recent meta-studies analyzing the research conducted 
since the early 1990s concludes that the minimum wage has little or no 
discernible effect on the employment prospects of low-wage workers” (Schmitt 
2013: 22).  
There are two possible ways to tackle the question of why this is the case. (1) 
Remaining within the traditional pre-analytic vision (i.e. accepting the 
ontological dimensions of the mainstream paradigm), one has to find 
“channels of adjustment” that could stop managers from firing workers as 
would be expected by the ordinary competitive market model (see 
Hirsch/Kaufman/Zelenska 2011: 1; Schmitt 2013: 11ff.): increasing 
productivity via training or lower labour-turnover or reducing the effect of 
nominal minimum wages on real minimum wages by allowing the cost to be 
passed on in the form of price increases. Of course, one could also assume that 
real world labour markets may be partly competitive (in some regions) and 
partly monopsonistic (in other regions): Depending on the employment shares 
of both market structures, this would cancel out positive and negative 
employment effects. (2) If one turns to a different pre-analytical vision – which 
would mean a truly heterodox approach5 – then a different prediction about 
the impact of minimum wages on employment becomes possible: one which is 
better in line with the empirical picture.  
This is exactly what the present paper attempts to provide. Taking the 
empirical evidence as a strong disincentive to accepting the traditional 
reasoning, we will provide a model of a post-Keynesian ‘employment market’ 
that not only suggests a macroeconomic frame, but is based on a pre-analytic 
vision of the economy as a system of nominal obligations (part 2)6. This 
                                                 
5 For a theoretical deduction of heterodox economics, see Heise/Thieme (2016: 1107ff.). 
6 To my knowledge, there are only three post-Keynesian studies on minimum wages, of which 
one is not in English (Seccareccia 1991) and the other two rather broad in nature 
(Herr/Kazandziska/Mahnkopf-Praprotnik 2009; Herr/Kazandziska 2011). It is important to 
note here that a monopsonistic labour market – which is sometimes rated as neo-Keynesian 
due to its imperfect competition assumption and even sometimes approximated with post-
Keynesianism because the late post-Keynesian Joan Robinson allegedly introduced 
monopsonistic labour markets into the economic literature (see Robinson 1933) – is an entirely 
different conception from the post-Keynesian employment market outlined in this article. Of 
course, monopsonistic firms may be introduced into a post-Keynesian employment market – 
these ideas will be pursued further in part 4 – yet the ontological foundations of both 
conceptions still remain incompatible.   
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general model needs to be restructured in such a way as to portray the effect of 
minimum wages on employment. As the effect of minimum wages is to 
hamper wage dispersion, or even to shrink the lower bound thereof, in order 
to avoid ‘unfair’ wages (or, morally speaking, ‘exploitation’) for that part of the 
labour force that is no longer covered by collective agreements (see Bachmann 
et al. 2008: 28ff.), we can rely on a two-sector model created to discuss the 
employment effects of growing wage dispersion (part 3). Finally, we need to 
judge the likely effect of minimum wages on employment under alternative 
assumptions regarding the parameters involved (part 4). The objective of the present 
paper is not to empirically test the proposed model but to provide a theoretical frame which 
conforms better to the overwhelming empirical evidence already available than the ordinary 
neoclassical models.  
 
2. A Post-Keynesian Model of the Employment Market 
 
Post-Keynesianism is a portmanteau term for a variety of quite different 
heterodox approaches. By relying closely on the ideas presented in Chap. 2 of 
Keynes’ magnum opus, fundamentalist or monetary Keynesianism appears to 
have elaborated the most highly-visible approach to providing an alternative to 
the ordinary labour market of the neoclassical mainstream (see e.g. Weintraub 
1957, Davidson/Smolensky 1964, Davidson 1994, Kregel 1984/85)7. Monetary 
Keynesianism does not only forcefully reject Walras’ law as (positive or 
negative) heuristic (see Heise 2017), it also provides a microeconomically-
based, yet macroeconomically-embedded employment determination that turns 
the quantity-price nexus of mainstream labour markets upside down. It is not 
the real wage rate that causally governs labour supply and demand until 
equilibrium is reached at the full employment level; but rather the quantity of 
labour demanded and supplied (at the level where real wage and profit 
expectations are fulfilled and, therefore, a stable position beyond the market-
clearing point is reached) is determined endogenously and simultaneously with 
                                                 
7 Of course, ever since Franco Modigliani’s extension of Hicks’ ISLM interpretation of 
Keynes’ General Theory (see Modigliani 1944), the labour market and employment determination 
have played a significant role in those economic approaches that are termed ‘Keynesian’. 
However, to my knowledge, other than monetary Keynesianism, there is no other post-
Keynesian approach that attempts explicitly to reject traditional labour market reasoning and to 
take seriously Keynes’ claim that the real wage is no exogenous control or distributive device, 
but is endogenously determined pari passu with the quantity of employment. Therefore, 
Lavoie’s approach (Lavoie 2014: 280ff.) is not followed here which – based on the conception 
of market rationing – rejects the idea of a ‘well-behaved’ uniquely negative employment-real 
wage relation with respect to effective as opposed to notional demand configurations. His 
intention is to introduce functional (not personal!) income distribution into employment 
determination but not to reject traditional real wage modelling altogether. 
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the real wage rate8. The employment market9, as will be developed below, 
cannot, therefore, be considered by way of a partial analysis, independently of 
its macro-economic environment. We will, thus, have first to outline a post-
Keynesian macro model, before we concentrate – but always keeping the macro-
economic links in mind – on the employment market.   
The stylised post-Keynesian model presented here is an elaboration of 
Setterfield (2006), Heise (2008) and Pusch/Heise (2010). It comprises 7 
structural and definitional equations and euilibrium conditions depicting the 
post-Keynesian core of the model. We start with the demand equation:  
 ),,,,(=
_
tt LGmIwD

 ,      (1) 
where D  is the value of aggregate demand, which evolves as a function of 
(given) nominal wages 
_
w , (given) nominal private investment outlays I
_
10, the 
(given) investment multiplier m , (given) governmental spending G , and 
labour employed L . 
The supply relation is:  
 
).,,(=
_
tt LTwZ         (2) 
Z  is the value of aggregate supply. T  denotes (given) technology. The next 
equation is an equilibrium condition:  
 
.tt ZD          (3) 
The price level p depends on the nominal (given) wage rate 
_
w , given 
technology and a given mark-up 
_
 :  
 
).,,(=
__
 Twpt        (4) 
Real income Y 
 
),,(= TLKY tt         (5) 
                                                 
8 „…, and the volume of employment is uniquely related to a given level of real wages – not 
the other way round“ (Keynes 1936: 30). 
9 Throughout this paper, I will call the virtual place of employment determination from a post-
Keynesian perspective the ‘employment market’, in order to distinguish it from the ordinary 
‘labour market’ of neoclassical provenance. 
10 This, of course, is a very delicate assumption for a post-Keynesian model. It is set forth here 
only for the sake of simplicity and to reduced the complexity of the model as proposed by one 
referee.   
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is dependent on production factors and technology. L  is the level of 
employment determined by eq. (3), K  is the (given) stock of real capital.  
We need to realize that equilibrium employment Lt determined in the aggregate 
demand-aggregate supply section merely explains the aggregate employment 
demand by firms given their demand expectations are met. In order to 
understand whether such equilibrium employment demand matches the supply 
of labour provided by households, we either have to assume a given amount of 
labour brought forward at the ruling nominal wage rate (irrespective of what 
the real wage rate will turn out to be) or, as will be done here, we assume a 
behavioural function of labour supply LS dependend on the given wage rate 
and an expected price level pe: 
 
),(= wpL eS 
         (6) 
In order to satisfy the conditions of expectational equilibrium, we need to 
extend the model: 
 pe = pt         (7) 
The model comprises an aggregate demand-aggregate supply section (eq. 1–3) 
determining the equilibrium employment level, an ordinary production 
function (eq. 5), mark-up pricing (eq. 4), labour supply (eq. 6) and a stability 
condition (eq. 7). The model is distinctly post-Keynesian in nature inasmuch 
as: the employment level depends on the propensity to consume, the incentive 
to invest, the nature of long-term expectations, i.e. eployment and overall 
output is determined by effective demand conditions (see Keynes (1936: 250). 
The post-Keynesian employment market is depicted by the aggregate demand 
– aggregate supply section (eq. 1 – 3) and has first been elaborated by the late 
Sidney Weintraub (1957). As shown in fig. 1, overall employment is 
determined by the intersection of the aggregate demand curve D and the 
aggregate supply curve Z. The D-curve is the aggregation of firms’ 
expectations about nominal revenues taking the nominal wage rate as given. 
The Z-curve is the aggregation of firms’ nominal costs associated with a certain 
level of employment, the given nominal wage rate, technology, and fixed 
capital stock. The resultant quantity of employment in the overall economy is 
thus the number of jobs made available by employers under profit 
maximization principles in a world of fundamental uncertainty.  
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Fig. 1: Employment determination in a Z-D-model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
        
 
Whether L* equals the quantity of employment supplied by households at the 
ruling wage rate (eq. 6), surpasses it or falls short of it, cannot be predicted 
with accuracy – in economic history, we have experienced all three 
constellations11. What can be said with some certainty is that a mature 
economy with a large capital stock (i.e. low marginal efficiency of capital), high 
income and saturation level (i.e. low marginal propensity to consume), and 
high labour market participation rates for both men and women will be far less 
likely to secure full employment than an economy with lower capital stock (i.e. 
higher marginal efficiency of capital), lower income and saturation levels (i.e. 
higher marginal propensity to consume), and lower labour market participation 
rates. What can also be said is that any disequilibrium between supply and 
demand of employment cannot easily be cured by curtailing wage aspirations 
(see e.g. Davidson 1994: 179ff.), as the nominal wage rate (which is the 
appropriate controlable variable) enters equally into both aggregate demand 
and supply functions – graphically acting as a shift parameter that leaves the 
intersection of the curves unaltered with respect to the quantity of 
employment12. Therefore, Keynes and post-Keynesians favour(ed) a wage regime that is 
                                                 
11 Post-war (West) German economic history, for instance, showed a period of ‚excess 
employment up until the early 1970s (when migrant labour was invited into Germany to close 
the gap), ‚full employment until the first oil crisis in the mid-1970s and unemployment ever 
since. 
12 This result rests on two assumptions: (1) a closed economy; and (2) endogenous money. Of 
course, the assumption of a closed economy is not very realistic. But the introduction of 
external economic relations does not necessarily produce a different result (this depends on the 
exchange rate system) or would imply a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy. The second assumption 
 
Nominal 
revenues; 
nominal 
costs 
Quantity of 
employment 
).,,(=
_
tt LTwZ 
 
),,,,(=
_
ttt LGmIwD 
 
L* 
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able to introduce some downward rigidity as an institutional device for safeguarding the 
stability of the economic system13.  
It is necessary to point out at this stage that a labour market in which supply 
and demand for labour is equilibrated by real wage movements does not exist 
in any operative way (see e.g., Lucas 1981: 242; Darity/Horn 1988: 220; Heise 
2017). Real wages can neither be determined exogenously by the parties to 
collective bargaining nor by individual actors, but will be determined in line 
with employment and the price-level once the nominal wage rate is set and the 
production technology is given. Taking the common features of a ‘well-
behaved’ production function for granted (eq. 6)14, higher employment is ceteris 
paribus associated with a lower real wage rate. But this correlation cannot be 
turned into a causality running from lower real wages to higher employment. 
 
3. A Sectoral Refinement 
 
In order to discuss the effect of minimum wages on employment, we need to 
portray a stylized two-sector model of the post-Keynesian employment market 
(see Heise 1998; Heise 1999): sector A comprises all firms that are affected by 
the minimum wage and sector B comprises all firms that pay wages above the 
minimum wage level (see fig. 2)15. 
LA and LB denote the quantities of employment in sector A and B 
respectively16; u depicts unemployment. What we are interested in is the impact 
of an increase in the nominal wage rate in sector A up to the level of a fixed 
                                                 
is, of course, a basic post-Keynesian assumption, which undermines the likelihood of positive 
real-balance effects in favour of negative real-balance effects in case of a severe deflationary 
process. 
13 “In the light of these considerations I am now of the opinion that the maintenance of a 
stable general level of money-wages is, on the balance of considerations, the most advisable 
policy for a closed system; …” (Keynes 1936: 270). 
14 This, of course, may be seen critically by Sraffians. However, it conforms to Keynes’ 
acceptance of the ‚first fundamental postulate in the General Theory (Keynes 1936: 5ff.). 
Moreover, we interpreted Sraffa’s critique not as a complete refutation of a “well-behaved” 
production function but as the theoretical proof that the particular properties of a well-
behaved aggregate production function (i.e. the falling marginal productivities of the factors of 
production) may not hold in any case. However, the empirical relevance of this theoretical 
possibility is still open to discussion; see e.g. Hamermesh 1986, Felipe/McCombie 2005. 
15 Of course, sector A will comprise firms from many different industrial sectors and branches. 
In Germany, most firms with most of the employees that will be affected by the minimum 
wage legislation are from branches such as agriculture, forestry and fishing, retail, 
transportation, food and beverages, and hotels and restaurants (see Bellmann et al. 2015). 
16 In different studies (see Knabe/Schöb/Thum 2014; Brenke/Müller 2013; Falck et al 2013; 
Heumer/Lesch/Schröder 2013; Kalina/Weinkopf 2013), the percentage of employees affected 
by the minimum wage in Germany, i.e. LA, ranges between 14% - 20% of total employment. 
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minimum wage rate, while the wage rate in sector B stays unchanged. As 
elaborated in Heise (1998: 254ff.), the sectoral employment effect of a change 
in the sectoral wage rate depends on the relative weight of the ‘substitution 
effect’ of relative price changes of commodities (i.e. the respective sectoral 
price elasticities of demand) and the ‘income effect’ of (wage) income changes 
(i.e. the respective income elasticities of demand). The overall employment 
effect can be summarized as follows17: 
N° = k (ηA,A + ηB,A – εA – 1) wA° + (1 – k) (ηB,B + ηA,B - εB – 1) wB°  (8) 
(εi = absolute value of the own price-elasticity of demand for commodities of sector i; ηi,j = 
income-elasticity of demand of wage earners of sector j for commodities of sector I;k = 
employment share of sector A; ° denotes the rate of growth [percentage change] of a variable) 
 
Figure 2: A Post Keynesian 2-sector-model of the employment market 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us assume the introduction of a fixed, binding minimum wage for all 
branches, resulting in an increase of the nominal wage rate in sector A by x%, 
while the nominal wage rate in sector B stays unchanged: 
    wA° = x 
   wB° = 0 
Disregarding cross-price elasticities of demand and any possible reaction from 
the central bank, the employment effect will be18: 
   NA° = k (ηA,A – εA – 1) wA° + (1 - k) ηA,B wB° (9) 
                                                 
17 For a derivation see appendix A  
18 Herr/Kazandziska/Mahnkopf-Praprotnik (2009: 12) come to the following conclusion with 
respect to employment effects of minimum wages in a post-Keynesian approach: “…: 
minimum wages will change the structure of wages, the structure of prices, the structure of 
demand for final products and the structure of demand for inputs. How employment is 
affected is theoretically open and extremely difficult to predict empirically.” If ‘theoretically 
open’ is to mean that there may be different post-Keynesian model specifications with 
potentially different results, the statement is correct but also somewhat trivial. And whether the 
effects are ‘extremely difficult to predict’ depends on the specific model specification – formal 
specifications as opposed to narrative approaches, at least, offer the chance to make prediction 
rather easy. Whether such predictions can easily be falsified empirically, is yet another question 
and depends on the testability of the theoretical predictors. But, maybe, that is what they 
meant by ‘extremely difficult to predict empirically’.     
LA u LB 
ZA 
D
A 
DB 
Z
B 
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   NA° | wA° = k (ηA,A – εA – 1) x   (9a) 
   NB° = (1 – k) (ηB,B – εB – 1) wB° + k ηB,A wA° (10) 
    NB° | wA° = k ηB,A x      (10a) 
   N° | wA° = k (ηA,A + ηB,A – εA – 1) x   (11) 
 
The ‘substitution effect’ is given by the magnitude of the price-elasticity of 
demand for those commodities produced by workers affected by the minimum 
wage legislation, εA; the ‘income effect’ is determined by the income elasticities 
of demand of those workers affected by the minimum wage for commodities 
from sector A, ηA,A, and for commodities from sector B, ηB,A (see eq. 11). 
From eq. 9a and eq. 10a, the respective sectoral impacts of the introduction of 
a minimum wage in sector A can be specified. Obviously, they will be of 
different magnitude and they might also be of different sign: While sector B 
might gain from minimum wages in sector A (income effect), sector A itself 
will have to weigh the positive income effect against the negative substitution 
effect. Most likely, the employment impact in sector B will be positive, while it 
will be negative in sector A (see Fig. 3). 
Figure 3: A Post Keynesian employment market with minimum wage 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: mw denotes the respective function or variable after the introduction of a 
minimum wage 
LA u LB 
ZA 
DA 
DB 
ZB 
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4. Discussion 
 
From chapter 19 of the General Theory, we can infer that Keynes was rather 
skeptical about the positive effect of wage reductions on employment 
outcomes. Contrary to neoclassical labour market theory19, Keynes argued that 
both moderate wage reductions and moderate wage increases, which result in 
neither massive deflationary nor massive inflationary pressure, will affect the 
price level, but not the total quantity of employment (see Keynes 1936: 267). It 
is only once wage changes trigger a contractionary monetary reaction or 
markedly increase the real burden of nominal obligations that negative 
employment effects are likely to occur. 
 
4.1 Predicting the Likelihood of Employment Effects 
 
Keynes, however, assumed a single nominal wage rate for all firms (by 
transforming different types of labour into ‘ordinary labour’) and thus 
concentrated on change in the general wage level, while ignoring the possible 
effects of a change in the wage structure. In order to shift our attention to 
precisely this object of inquiry, we had to refine the simple post-Keynesian 
employment market model by introducing two different sectors, A and B, in 
which the nominal wage rates wA and wB differ and may change in different 
ways. As we have seen, the sectoral, as well as total, employment effect of a 
change in the wage structure due to the introduction of a general, binding 
minimum wage depends on the respective magnitudes of the income- and 
price-elasticities of demand. 
In order to predict the effect of a minimum wage in sector A, we would have 
to estimate the price-elasticity of demand for those commodities affected by 
the introduction of a minimum wage and the income-elasticities of demand of 
the wage-earners of sector A. This, alas, poses serious problems20. While the 
income-elasticities of wage-earners affected by a minimum wage can be 
reasonably assumed to be quite high (i.e. around the magnitude of 1), the price-
elasticities of demand for those commodities affected by the minimum wage 
may vary considerably as they are very different (see footnote 14). Tab. 1 
                                                 
19 Pigou’s Theory of Unemployment (Pigou 1933) which Keynes explicitly criticized in his General 
Theory, can still be seen as the foundation of modern labour market theory. 
20 As mentioned earlier, the proposed two-sector model is highly stylized. It is extremely 
difficult to empirically test this model as no real-world economy is comprised of just two 
sectors showing the proclaimed features. Moreover, the particular price- and income-elasticities 
cannot easily be estimated. Therefore, siding with Keynes’ (1939; 1940) rather sceptical 
approach to econometric methods, I refrain from own statistical interferences but rather rely 
on judging the likelihood of parameters.   
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summarises a number of parameter constellations that are possible, but not all 
equally likely.  
 
Tab. 1: Employment impact of minimum wages under different 
parameter constellations 
 
Price- and income 
elasticities of 
demand 
Employment impact Likelihood 
 
 
1) ηA,A ≈  1; ηB,A ≈  1 
 
a. |εA| ≈  1 
b. |εA| > 1 
c. |εA| < 1 
 
Total 
 
 
 
° 
- 
+ 
Sector A 
 
 
 
- 
-- 
+° 
Sector B 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
High 
 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
 
2) ηA,A < 1; ηB,A < 1 
 
a. |εA| ≈ 1 
b. |εA| > 1 
c. |εA| < 1 
 
 
 
 
- 
-- 
°- 
 
 
 
- 
-- 
- 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
Low  
Low 
 
Note:  no effect; - very small negative effect, - small negative effect, -- large 
negative effect, + very small positive effect, + small positive effect 
 
As already noted, it appears rather likely that the income-elasticity of low 
income earners – i.e. those that are affected by the minimum wage – is close to 
unity21. This is due to the fact that the marginal propensity to consume of low 
income earners can be assumed to be high (i.e. close to 1) – as the income-
elasticity is defined as the ratio of the marginal propensity to consume to the 
average propensity to consume, it must be close to unity in this case (see tab. 
1). But even if the marginal propensity to consume is assumed to be markedly 
lower than 1, as my be the case if minimum wage earners are beneficiaries of 
supplemental transfer income (‘Aufstocker’) or secondary wage earners 
                                                 
21 Dynan/Skinner/Zeldes (2004: 416) calculate savings ratios of the lowest income quintile 
between -22% and +9% depending on different income definitions. With such low savings (i.e. 
high consumption) ratios, the income elasticity must be close to unity.  
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(‘Zuverdiener’)22, this does not necessarily imply a much lower income-elasticity 
(as the average propensity to consume will also be lower than 1 in such a case 
and the ratio of both may well be not far less than unity). However, assuming 
for a moment a much smaller income-ealsticity (i.e. η > 1 in tab. 1) for such 
minimum wage earners, this would only lower the average income-elasticty of 
all minimum wage earners under the condition of the minimum wage earners 
with low income-elasticity being a big fraction of all23 – it appears save not to 
rule out entirely the coincidence of both but to rate it at best of medium 
likelihood (i.e. ‘medium’ in tab. 1). The case of an income-elasticity of (much) 
higher than unity would imply a growing marginal propensity to consume with 
rising income – a case which consumer theory does not discuss as a rational 
behaviour. It is therefore excluded here. 
With respect to price-elasticities, we should keep in mind that industries 
producing goods and services for basic needs are supposed to be faced with 
lower price-elasticities of demand than industries producing more advanced or 
luxurious goods. Also, minimum wage earners tend to be more employed in 
basic industries than more advanced industries (see e.g. BLS 2017: tab. 4 and 5 
for the US). Therefore, although the price-elasticity of commodities of sector 
A can only be estimated from empirical research, we would attribute a higher 
likelihood to a lower than average price-elasticity of demand for goods from 
sector A: Meta-studies on price-elasticities (Tellis 1988, Maurer 1995) show an 
enormous variation ranging from -10 to +2. According to these studies, the 
average price-elasticity is about –1,8. Taking into consideration a reporting 
bias24, the arguments above and the fact that these empirical elasticities are 
measured by way of partial analysis (i.e. assuming changes only in the relative 
price of the one commodity under investigation), whereas the introduction of a 
minimum wage will affect many commodities and thus the relative price 
impact on the single commodity will be lower, the assumption of (close to) 
unity price-elasticity appears justified, but a higher as well as a lower magnitude 
is not entirely unlikely. 
                                                 
22 Müller/Steiner (2013) show that about one-third of wage-earners affected by the minimum 
wage in Germany live in households in the upper half of the income scale. Although it remains 
unclear what this means for consumption behaviour of the respective wage-earner, it may 
indicate the empirical importance of secondary wage earners at least in Germany. 
23 Knabe/Schöb/Thum (2014: 147ff.) estimate that about 10% of all employees affected by a 
minimum wage in Germany are recipients of supplemental transfer income (‘Aufstocker’). 
24 “The ‘file drawer hypothesis’ suggests there may be many studies that are unpublished 
because their results are not consistent with the normal expectation of a significantly negative 
price elasticity. The negatively skewed distribution of elasticities…seems to support this 
hypothesis” (Tellis 1988: 337). 
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To summarize, most likely are income- and price-elasticities of demand for 
goods and services from sector A close to unity (i.e. case 1a. in tab. 1 implying 
a high likelihood) – which translates into a negligible overall employment 
effect. However, a small positive or negative impact of a statutory minimum 
wage on the economy-wide employment level is possible, but not very likely 
(i.e. cases 1b., 1c. and 2a. in tab. 1 indicating a medium liklihood). Moreover, 
the most probable outcome combines an indiscernible overall employment 
effect with small sectoral employment shifts: sector A is likely to experience a small 
negative employment change while sector B is likely to realize some small employment gains.    
 
4.2 Monopsonistic firms 
 
A final thought shall be given to the case of a monopsonistic labour market. 
Although I am skeptical about the empirical relevance of such a market 
structure25, the monopsonistic labour market model has received considerable 
attention because it appeared to be the only theoretical foundation for those 
who attempted to reject the glooming negative employment outcome of 
minimum wages as exposed by the ordinary competitive labour market model. 
We have presented a different approach challenging this commonly negative 
employment effect – however, it may be of interest to see what difference the 
labour market structure makes within a post-Keynesian model. And it is here 
that the Lavoie-model becomes a potentially useful analytical tool: The ‘Lavoie-
model’ (see Lavoie 2014: 280ff.) claims to be able to analyse the importance of 
functional income distribution for the determination of employment by 
introducing the distinction between notional and effective labour demand (see 
Fig. 4): The ‘notional’ demand for labour is basically portrayed by the ordinary 
negatively sloped labour demand curve assuming decreasing labour 
productivity but disregarding demand constraints from the commodity market. 
Such constraints are integrated into the construction of a hump-shaped 
‘effective’ demand curve for labour assuming the demand for commodities 
                                                 
25 There are only very few studies addressing the empirics of monopsonistic labour markets. 
Most of them concentrate on very narrow regional, industry-specific markets (e.g. 
Ransom/Sims 2010) and estimate the wage-elasticity of labour supply (e.g. Falch 2010, 
Staiger/Spetz/Phibbs 2010, Booth/Katic 2011). For Germany, Bachmann/Frings (2017) 
report, quite in line with most of these other studies, wage elasticities which appear to be low 
enough not to assume perfectly competitive labour markets. Moreover, they appear to be 
industry-specific with only a few low-wage industries (such as Hotels and Restaurants) showing 
wage-elasticities of a magnitude that might indicate market power for firms. In any case, a 
monopsony is characterized by restrictions on the demand- side of the market, not particular 
features on the supply-side. Therefore, it is debatable whether wage-elasticities are an 
appropriate measure for the monopsony-status of a certain market although this may be the 
standard procedure nowadays.       
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(and, therefore, the demand for labour under the condition of a given 
technique and capital stock) out of consumption spending by wage-earners and 
(given) autonomous spending by capitalists. Assuming that wage-earners spend 
all their wage income, effective labour demand is primarily dependent on the 
autonomous spending of capitalists who earn what they spent. 
 
Figure 4: Notional and effective labour demand curves  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hump-shape of the effective labour demand curve indicates the respective 
change of the real wage in order to maintain commodity market clearing: The 
effective labour demand curve reaches a local maximum at the real wage rate 
(w/P)1, intersecting the notional labour demand curve at the employment level 
of L1. This is where the real wage rate just equals (marginal) labour productivity 
and portrays the situation of a competitive labour market. However, if the 
labour market is supposed to reflect a (regional) monopsony26, the idea is that 
the monopsonistic firm may charge a mark-down on wages, pays only (w/P)2 
                                                 
26 One referee criticized my restriction of the monopsony model to the case of regional 
monopsonitic firms. Although it appears obvious that firms can create a monopsonitic 
position (i.e. being the only employer) in the labour market only – if at all – at the regional 
level, ‚modern monopsony theories‘ are said not to rest on the ‚single firm assumption‘ but the 
idea that firms have the structural power to set real wages below their competitive levels due to 
labour market imperfections on the supply side: the introduction of transaction cost (e.g. job 
search or mobility costs) allow for a restricted deviation of offered real wages from market-
clearing real wages (i.e. ‚mark-down‘). We will deal with this argument later – however, it 
should be clear that it is of entirely different nature than the monopsonistic labour market 
argument. What Erickson/Mitchell (2007) dubs ‘a metaphor for the emerging post-union 
labour market’, I would prefer to call a ‘misnomer’.       
w/P 
L 
LD effective 
LDnotional 
(w/P)
1 (w/P)2 
L1 L2 L3 
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and, thus changes functional income distribution in its own favour. Ceteris 
paribus, in order to maintain commodity market equilibrium, the monopsonistic 
company would either have to decrease employment to L2 or increase it to L3. 
This rather unfamiliar result originates from the fact that lower employment 
payed at the wage rate that equals its (marginal) labour productivity would 
create excess demand on the commodity market as long as autonomous 
capitalist spending is not reduced. And due to decreasing returns, the real 
wage-rate would also have to be reduced in the case when employment is 
increased to L3 in order to guanrantee commodity market equilibrium.  
Although employment would theoretically be indetermined in case of a change 
in functional income distribution, it appears more likely that L2 will be chosen 
by the monopsonistic firm as the curtailment of employment demand will be 
the device to reduce the real wage rate to (w/P)2 and the profit rate (not real 
profits which are constant along the effective demand curve) will be higher 
than in the case of L3. What this means is that any change in functional income 
distribution due to monopsonistic market power on the labour market will 
reduce the employment level as compared to a competitive market strcuture 
and, hence, any increase in the real wage rate between (w/P)2 and (w/P)1 due 
to minimum wage legislation will increase employment rather than lower it. 
This result appears quite in line with the foregoing post-Keynesian analysis 
indicating that the income effect of a minimum wage overcompensates the 
substitution effect. 
Of course, this result rests on a number of assumptions which have all been 
made explicite in the argumentation above, namely: a) (given) autonomous 
spending of the capitalists , b) the ability of the monopsonistic firm to impose 
a mark-down on the real wage rate and, thus, to influence functional income 
distribution. While the first assumption can be accepted as a partial analytical 
tool to isolate the labour market from its broader macroeconomic 
environment, yet for a determinantion of the employment level, spending of 
the capitalists must certainly be endogenized as it determines the exact location 
of the effective demand curve. The second assumption is more serious as it 
appears to contradict the post-Keynesian postulate of the endogeneity of real 
wages (see Herr/Kazandziska/Mahnkopf-Praprotnik 2009: 8). How are 
monopsonistic firms able to charge a mark-down on real wages if all they can 
control is the nominal wage rate? Of course, if the price level P is fixed, any 
reduction in the nominal wage rate w – forced by a reduction in labour 
demand as from L1 to L2 – would be enough to get the assumed result
27. But 
why should the price level remain unaltered, if nominal spending and nominal 
                                                 
27 And that is obviously what Lavoie (2014: 283) has in mind when he equates an increase in 
nominal wages w with an increase with real wages w/P. 
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wage costs fall? This could only be the case if incomplete competition – on the 
commodity market, not the labour market – would allow for a price-setting 
behaviour of the firms (see eq. 4)28. However, on the one hand that would be 
an additional assumption which is entirely unrelated to the assumption of a 
(regional) monopsony on the labour market and, even if assumed, would allow 
for the charging of a mark-up on prices irrespective of the market structure of 
the labour market the firm is acting in.  
On the other hand, even if a regional monopsony in the labour market is 
assumed, any decrease in the nominal wage rate due to market power in the 
labour market would be passed on to prices as long as the competitive 
structure in the commodity market does not change – only this would make it 
possible to raise the mark-up and, in this way, increase the mark-down on 
wages29. Therefore, the analysis based on the ‘Lavoie-model’ explains how functional income 
distribution – however derived - impacts on the demand for labour, yet it does not give support 
to the proposition that a (regional) monopsonistic labour market has any direct influence on 
the real wage rate and employment level and therefore, no independent argument can 
be derived from this analysis that would predict an increase in employment as 
the result of an economy-wide, binding minimum wage.         
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As shown in Tab. 1, the impact of the introduction of an economy-wide, 
binding minimum wage on overall employment in a post-Keynesian 
perspective is most likely to be negligible or at least very small, provided no 
contractionary monetary reaction is triggered. The picture may, however, look 
different if single branches or the whole of sector A, comprising all industries 
that are affected by the minimum wage, are taken separately. This result is very 
much in line with the empirical findings of the above-mentioned meta-studies 
and appears to fit reality (with respect to deviant industry results; see e.g. 
                                                 
28 Please remember that eq.4 indicates the possibility of a mark-up over marginal cost (i.e. π > 
1) in case of restrictions on competition in goods markets. If perfect competition is assumed, π 
happens to be 1.  
29 One referee claimed not to be convinced by my reasoning. However, leaving the logical 
rigour of the argument aside, the difference in opinion lies in different assumptions: while the 
argument of real wage-setting (‚monopsonistic‘) firms rests on the assumption of a ‚barter 
economy‘, ‚real-exchange economy‘ or ‚neutral economy‘ as pre-analytic vision „in which the 
factors of production are rewarded by dividing up in agreed proportions the actual output of 
their co-operative efforts“ (Keynes 1933: 77), my argument of endogenous real wages is based 
on the ontology of a ‚money wage economy‘ or ‚entrepreneur economy‘ „in which the 
entrepreneurs hire the factors for money but without such a mechanism as the above“ (Keynes 
1933: 78). These ontological differences make it clear why a monopsonistic labour market 
model is not to be mixed up with a post-Keynesian employment market model.  
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Machin/Manning/Rahman 2003, König/Möller 2007) much better than either 
the neoclassical mainstream labour market model of perfect competition or 
that of monopsony. 
Moreover, the labour market structure has no impact of its own on functional 
income distribution and – other than its possible impact on the wage structure 
(i.e. personal income distribution) – on the employment level. Therefore, 
support for minimum wages in order to institutionally assist collective 
bargaining systems which can no longer protect low wage earners does not 
have to rest on theoretical foundations which are of dubious empirical 
significance.   
 
Appendix A 
 
Specifying eq. 1 and eq. 2 and assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that only 
wage earners consume and no governmental spending is considered, we get: 
Zi= (πi/ωi) wi Ni, Di = ci,i wi Ni + cj,i wj Nj + Ii and Dj = cj,j wj Nj + ci,j wi Ni + Ij 
with πi = average labour productivity in sector i and ωi = marginal labour 
productivity in sector i; wi = nominal wage rate in sector i and Ni = 
empoyment in sector i; ci,j = marginal propensity to consume commodities 
from sector j of wage earners from sector i and Ii = (autonomous) investment 
spending on commodities of sector i, with i = sector A and j = sector B. Now, 
the percentage rate of change of employment with respect the rate of change 
of the nominal wage rate depends on the relative rate of change of the D- and 
Z-functions:  
In order to determine the percentage rate of change of a variable, we split the 
demand curve Di into parts Di
i , Di
j , Di
I and transfer the demand and supply 
equations into their natural logarithmic version: 
 
lnDi
i = lnci,i wi Ni  
 
lnDi
j = lncj,i wj Nj  
 
lnDi
I = lnIi 
 
lnDj
j = lncj,j wj Nj  
 
lnDj
i = lnci,j wi Ni  
 
lnDj
I = lnIj 
 
lnZi = ln(πi/ωi) wi Ni  
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Differatiating the log aggregate demand functions with respect to changes in 
the nominal wage wi and implying Di = pi Y
D
i (with Y
D
i being real output 
demanded of sector i), we get: 
 
d(lnYDi
i)/d(lnwi) = d(lnci,i) – d(lnpi) 
 
d(lnYDj
i)/d(lnwi) = d(lncj,i)  
 
As it can be shown that diffentiated natural logarithmic equations translate into 
elasticities (for d(lny)/d(lnx) = (dy/y)/(dx/x) = elasticity of x with respect to y; 
see Chiang 1984: 304f.)), we get: 
 
YD° = YDi
i° + YDj
i°= (ηi,i + ηj,i - εi )wi° 
 
Differentiating the log aggregate supply function with respect to changes in the 
nominal wage and executing the same operation as above, we get: 
 
d(lnYSi)= d(lnwi)  
 
or 
 
YSi° = wi° 
 
Assuming that any change in real output translates into a proportional change 
of employment (i.e. Yi° = Ni°) the percentage rate of change of employment in 
sector i due to a percentage change in wages depends on the difference 
between the percentage rate of change of aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply: 
 
Ni° = (ηi,i + ηj,i - εi - 1) wi°  
 
The overall employment effect, assuming k to be the share of employment in 
sector i (and, respectively, (1-k) as employment share of sector j), we get:  
 
N° = k (ηi,i + ηj,i – εi – 1) wi° + (1 – k) (ηj,j + ηi,j - εj – 1) wj° 
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